Unpacking the indirect effects and consequences of  environmental regulation by Tan, Kim Hua et al.
1 
 
Unpacking the Indirect Effects and Consequences of  
Environmental Regulation 
 
Interantional Journal of Production Economics 
Abstract 
Environmental regulation and its corresponding measures and control is an important issue but have not been fully 
investigated. Literature on the unintended consequences of regulation control and measures appears to be sparse. 
Through a series of exploratory case studies in China, this paper examines the various unintended impacts of 
ecological civilisation (EC) regulation on firms’ operations and their related consequences to performance. Findings 
showed that there were interrelated themes that underpin the indirect and unintended effects of regulatory control 
and performance management. This exploratory study can contribute to both theory building and provide important 
EC policy implications by: (a) enriching the conceptual understanding of the unintended consequences of 
environmental regulation on firms’ behaviours and outcomes, (b) providing policy maker important insights and 
practical advices for regulating environmental performance.  
Keywords: Performance Measurement; Environmental Regulation; Indirect Effects; Sustainability; Ecological 
Civilisation (EC), China. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.01.017 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Unintended consequences of performance management is an important issue but have not been 
fully investigated (Meyer, 2009). The debate on environmental performance management is still 
limited. Governments tend to use various regulations and measures to enhance environmental 
performance, both at the local governmental level (achieving public policy goals, such as 
protecting the environment and public from environmental hazards and minimizing industrial 
wastes) and at the individual firm levels (achieving sustainable business growth and financial 
performance goals). Such regulations and measures can have both positive intended and negative 
unintended effects, depending on firm size, industry, and embedded contexts of the firms (Tan 
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and Rae, 2009).  However, previous studies have been largely focused on the positive side which 
can have a short-term effect on environmental performance (Tan et al., 2014; Tseng et al., 2014), 
but ignoring the potential long-term and indirect effects, which can eventually lead to unintended 
and negative consequences to performance, both economically and environmentally.  
Concerns about sustainable development have grown significantly during the last decade 
(Brizga et al., 2014; Foo, 2013). In China, sustainable development is guided by a philosophy of 
‘Ecological Civilisation’ (EC). Under the EC philosophical framework, various metrics and 
indicators were set for regional governments and firms to create more wealth using less energy. 
However, local government officers or firms may manipulate set metrics to meet their own 
interests or to cover their failure to meet the various pressures of achieving the set targets (Tan et 
al., 2014). For example, it was reported that in 2010 there were plethora enforced blackouts in 
many cities, where hospitals, schools, and traffic lights had their power cut off when local 
government failed to meet the tough energy and emissions targets set by the central government 
in 2006 (Si, 2012). Clearly, in this incident, the pressure to ensure EC compliance (meeting the 
set targets, which could be overly broad and complex) had forced the officials to cover the reality 
by fiddling the data.  
Nonetheless, the unintended effect of environmental regulations is not only unique in 
China, but also in other developed and developing countries. For example, it was only one year 
after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster that the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) 
has admitted their failure to meet basic safety requirements (such as risk assessment, collateral 
damage preparation and evacuation plan development) in fear of eliciting lawsuits or protests 
against its nuclear plants. There are also a number of examples from the auto-mobile industries 
recently. Goulder et al (2012) points out that in response to the climate change, 14 states in 
America took a series of initiatives to limit greenhouse gas emission per mile. The unintended 
effect of that was the large car manufacturers in the 14 states decided to relocate to other states 
which have lower emission control. Because the restriction has largely decreased the profit 
margin of the large-car manufacturer, so rather than devoting to innovation on reducing 
emission, they chose to move out of the regulated states (Tan et al., 2014). Another recent 
 example was related to Volkswagen intentionally programmed their diesel engines to meet US 
standards during regulatory testing but emit up to 40 times more nitrogen oxide in real-world 
driving. The above examples suggested that regulated measures not only failed to improve the 
environmental performance of the automobile industry, but also have unintended consequences 
to the company long term performance and local economy. In developing countries, one example 
can be found in the 1989 Hoy No Circula (today it doesn't circulate) scheme introduced by the 
Mexico City to combat air pollution. The city banned cars for one day per week depending on 
the last number of their number plate (i.e. cars with last number of 1 and 2 are banned on 
Monday, then 3 and 4 on Tuesday, and so on). Initially, the scheme achieved good results in 
bringing down carbon monoxide (CO) pollution levels by 11%. However, the scheme also led to 
the enlargement of second car market i.e. residents began buying second cars (often old 
inefficient ones) to get around the ban. The long-term impact of the scheme has been a 13% rise 
in CO (Mathiesen, 2014). 
Needless to say that EC regulation can cause unforeseen negative consequences in 
particularly when firms or individuals try to circumvent the regulations to avoid the high costs of 
compliance or behave opportunistically (Tan et al. 2014). But, what are the scope and extent of 
these unforeseen consequences that can have impact to economy, society and company 
performance? The evidence found in existing literature that has focused on the unintended 
consequences of regulation and its corresponding measures on firms’ operations appears to be 
sparse. In particular, how should firms respond to EC regulation? What performance 
measurement systems (i.e. metrics) will managers establish to comply with EC regulation? For 
example, to which extent measurement of performance and the corresponding incentive structure 
within firms can be compared with what the initial regulation intended. Thus, understanding the 
potential unforeseen consequences of metrics used by firms to comply with well-intended 
environmental regulation is vital – especially the unintended negative consequences on local 
environment and firms’ performance.  
This paper aims to examine the various unintended impacts of environmental regulation 
on firms’ operations and their related consequences to performance. This paper can contribute to 
both theory building and provide important policy implications by: (a) enriching the conceptual 
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understanding of the unintended consequences of regulation and environmental performance, 
and (b) providing policy maker important insights and practical advices for regulating 
environmental performance. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next 
section reviews the literature on the unintended consequences of environmental regulations and 
performance measurement systems. Section three outlines the research methodology. The 
findings are presented in section four, followed by a discussion of their significance and 
contribution. Finally, limitations and suggestions for future works are articulated.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Interest in performance measurement in sustainable operations has been driven by an increased 
demand for better environmental and green indicators in firms’ operations and economic 
development (Wu, et al. 2015).  There is also emphasis on demonstrating transparency in 
corporate social responsibility (for firms and governments) especially on environmental 
management (Huang & Chen, 2015). Many researches pointed out that tighter environmental 
regulation and public reporting leads to improvements in environmental management, and 
reported data provides information on areas of underperformance, leading to a stimulus 
(regulations) for improvement from the policy makers (Bricknell, 2010; Gilliland et al.,2002; 
Goulder et al., 2012; Powell, 2011; Tan and Rae, 2009). However, the assumption that 
regulations will result in improvements in environmental management rests on the assumption 
that the outcome being measured is amenable to compliance or improvement.  
How performance measures are used does varies with firms (Meyer, 2009). 
Unfortunately, most of the performance measurement (PM) literature focuses on the corporate-
level measures that monitor results rather than on measures that motivate appropriate behaviour 
(Weidinger and Platts, 2012; Waggoner et al. 1999). Performance measures at the corporate level 
tend to be aggregated (while appropriate to indicate overall firm performance), may not be suited 
to motivate appropriate employees’ behaviour to comply rigid environmental regulation 
measures. Thus, regulators must be conscious of the extent to which environmental metrics can 
be manipulated or gamed by firms, or the extent to which the metric can encourage undesired 
 behaviours. As such, regulation without robust metrics can affect a firm’s strategic direction and 
operations in different ways for different firms as well as triggering many unintended negative 
consequences to the environment.  
In the organizational theory literature, unintended consequences are the result of 
environmental uncertainty and the bounded rationality of organizational actors (Selznick, 1948). 
Predicting a manager’s action in an uncertain and complex world is not easy. Thus, some of the 
unintended consequences could be unstated, but not unintended (Osborn and Daniel, 1988). Tan 
and Rae (2009) argue that the impact can be dependent on firm size, industry, and the 
environmental and social contexts the firm located in. They further argued that the short-term 
implications of regulation and PM on the firm can be very different when comparing with the 
long term implications. For instance, regulation and performance measurement increases costs 
and reduces efficiency for all firms, but the impact will be greater for the smaller firm. In long-
term, most of the firms may attempt to find ways to reduce the costs and increase efficiency, 
though some may choose to minimize the compliance to regulation, whilst others through 
process improvement and innovation, but this will be achieved a lot quicker by the bigger firm 
who has more resources (Tan et al. 2014).  
Clearly, the outcomes of performance measures can have an interlocking impact on the 
effectiveness of the regulation. Nonetheless, in the literature there are only a few articles that 
mentioned unintended consequences of PM and regulation. These authors (Adcroft and Willis, 
2005; Brigham and Fitzgerald, 2001; Humphreys and Francis, 2002; Shaffer, 1995; Tan and Rae, 
2009) highlight that the relationship of regulation and PM is an area relatively unexplored. There 
are strong links exist between regulation and PM at firm level, in which regulation can have 
significant impact on the performance of the firm and the types of performance measures it uses. 
Tan et al. (2014) identified that regulation impacts on the firm at different levels: from the 
strategic level to the individual employee level, which in turn affect the performance 
measurement systems used by the firm. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
The study of the unintended consequences of regulation and performance measures has 
relatively little theoretical background (Tan and Rae, 2009; Tan et al. 2014). Thus, in order to 
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gain more insights into the issue, a series of empirical and archival case studies were carried out. 
The aim of the case study was to understand the scope, extent, and causes of unforeseen 
consequences of EC regulations. More specifically, the objective was to understand how best to 
achieve EC compliance and mitigate unforeseen consequences. ).  Figure 1 provides a graphical 
representation of the key steps in the research process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Key Steps in the Research Process 
3.1. Case selection 
A case study with six Chinese firms was conducted in this research. In order to enrich the data 
for building theory via case studies, researchers normally select cases using replication rather 
than sampling logic (Done, Voss & Rytter, 2011; Pagell & Wu, 2009). Thus, it is vital to select 
cases that provide the best opportunities to learn and extend theory. Two of the authors in this 
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 paper have a good contact within these firms, and thus able to get permission to gain access to 
individuals who are best informed about the data being researched. The willingness to cooperate 
for detailed discussion for such a sensitive research topic is crucial for generating in-depth data 
for the study.   
Justifications for the case selection are: a) these six firms are willing to share and discuss 
openly their experiences in dealing with EC regulatory control; b) the cases include some of the 
dynamic experiences of Chinese firms in managing growth and meeting environmental 
regulation challenges in local and global markets in recent years; and c) the cases cut across 
various geographical locations in China. The variety in the cases was a deliberate research design 
strategy chosen to increase the external validity of the study’s findings, and to assure that the 
findings were generalizable and not specific to any one type business or market (Yin, 1984). 
Synopses of the six firms are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: Case Background 
 
3.2. Data Collection 
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For each case, we collected data from different sources, including repeated field visits and 
interviews of managers from different organizational levels and functions: including senior 
management (i.e. CEO, Operations Manager, R&D Manager and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) Manager), and Project Managers. Using multiple interviewees brought a 
richer portrait of each case (Yin, 1984), and also to mitigate bias when come to historical data 
interpretation (recollection).   
The interviews were conducted between 2013 and 2014. All interviews were conducted 
via face-to-face interviews in companies either in the managers’ offices or meeting rooms and 
lasted about 45 to 90 minutes. Informal interviews also took place with other front line staff 
when the interviewers were conducting field observations. Field notes were taken throughout the 
visits. Various vignettes on unintended actions that managers commonly make in motivating and 
measuring their organizations with EC measures were collected, including multiple sources of 
data from published documents in the company website and independent publications. We also 
check out a relevant NGO website i.e. Green Choice Alliance (IPE, 2015) for relevant cases, 
news, and reports. 
All the formal interviews were agreed to be tape-recorded and then transcribed into hard 
copy scripts using word processing programme. In order to avoid researcher bias in data 
collection and analysis, visits to case study sites were conducted in pairs; this allowed the case to 
be viewed from different perspectives. Due to the fact that both interviewees and interviewers 
are native Mandarin Chinese speakers, it will be convenient for the interviews to be conducted 
by their first language. Hand-written notes were also taken as a backup in the event of equipment 
 failure. Each transcript can then be reviewed to compare the observation between the two 
interviewers. In addition, we also shown the final draft of transcripts to the interviewees to 
confirm that the contents truly reflected the interviewees’ original meaning. 
The aim of the interviews was to understand the scope, extent, causes, environmental and 
organizational factors (both internal and external) that underlying the studied phenomenon (a 
brief summary of the interview questions is shown in Table 2). Hence, the data are drawn from 
multiple levels and various perspectives. The extent of the fieldwork, the number of interviews, 
and the quality of the data provides rich data and important insights for the present study. 
Through triangulation with multiple sources of data collection, the research validity can be 
strengthened.  
Table 2: A brief summary of the interview questions 
Aim of Interview 
• To understand the scope, extent, causes of unforeseen consequences of EC regulations 
• To identify examples of unforeseen consequences 
• To understand the industrial need to achieve EC compliance and mitigate unforeseen 
consequences 
Guidelines for Interview 
1. Details of company (industry, personnel, turnover) 
2. Positive and negative experiences in dealing with EC regulatory control 
3. Challenges of managing growth and meeting EC regulation 
4. In-company performance measurement system in response to EC regulatory control 
5. Awareness of unforeseen consequences in the industry 
6. Desirable characteristics of a robust EC regulatory control 
 
3.3. Data Analysis 
The purpose of data analysis is to construct a theoretical framework as the story unfolded and to 
enrich the newly identified concepts for further theoretical articulation. The exploratory 
approach is recommended for this study context because it can help to examine the phenomenon 
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within various organizational contexts, define the boundaries, and triangulate data from different 
sources.  
The collected data were analysed through a systematic approach of three phrases: data 
reduction, coding, and data display (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Locke, 2001). The transcribed 
codes were categorized in terms of interview number, company name and question number. After 
several iterations, a pattern of well-defined codes (e.g. common themes and categories) was 
generated and identified. By investigating the statement of relationship between various 
measures, regulation control, and performance outcomes, we are able to explain the main themes 
with their conceptual properties. The final stage was to generate the relationship among the 
themes and categories and further explain the unforeseen consequences of environmental 
measures and performance. In order to ensure the accuracy of the codings, the author feedback 
the research data to the interviewed managers. An example of coding is shown in Table 3. In 
addition, the codings were also double-checked by an independent reviewer who is blind to the 
purpose of the research. The reviewer was given some representative codings and statements 
from the data of each category, and instructed to code them separately. The findings were 
discussed with this reviewer to confirm the reliability of codings and meanings of the data. The 
overall agreement of the coding samples is over 85%. This analytical approach helped to 
construct theory and ensure the reliability and validity of the findings (Eisenhardt 1989).  
Table 3. Examples of coding 
Examples (Quotes) Themes coded 
Some sort of social behaviour control maybe useful given the 
context of Chinese social structure - Case F 
 
An effective approach should be flexible enough to promote 
self-regulation and voluntary participation - Case C 
Regulatory control 
 
  
A mix approach to environmental regulation (punishment, 
transparency and flexibility) - Case C 
The lack of clearly defined measures can cause uncertainty 
among firms as to what could be considered deceptive or 
perverse - Case A 
 
Indirect effects 
 
Many firms fall short of full compliance in EC regulations at 
some points, but they believe fines due to violation of EC 
regulations were just a small cost of doing business - Case B 
 
Measures to decrease gaming are necessary to prevent 
perverse outcomes. EC goals should be specific, ambitious, 
and measurable against an established baseline, such as carbon 
emissions - Case F 
Dysfunctional of performance 
measurement 
 
 
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
In our analysis, three main themes emerged from the case studies were: regulatory control; 
indirect effects, and dysfunctional of performance measurement. In the following sections, each 
theme will be explored in more in-depth.  
 
4.1 Regulatory Control 
Participants in all six cases pointed out that regulatory control is one of the main issues need 
further improving. Currently, the EC environmental regulatory system that involving a complex 
set of laws and guidelines seems difficult for them to follow. Moreover, the enforcement power 
also can be confusing as it usually involves the central government and their various regional and 
local affiliates. The aim of the regulatory system is to protect the environment and public from 
environmental hazards and/or industrial wastes. However, participants in Cases C and E point 
out that when regulated firms failed to conform to the EC rules prescribed by law and 
administered by the controlling agency, the results can be dreadful. For example, firms that 
failed to conform will be asked to cease operations and pay massive fines. A manager in Case A 
argued that it is important to examine the regulatory control mechanisms at the field level and 
how regulated firms respond to these controls. 
The concerns raised by the participants in the case studies echo the findings in the 
literature. Gililand and Manning (2002) point out that conformance, which is difficult to achieve 
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in many inter-organizational settings, is particularly problematic in a regulatory context because 
of the ideological differences that exist between agencies and firms. These differences in 
ideology pertain to issues such as the role government regulators should play in meeting public 
policy goals and the high perceived cost of compliance to mandated standards (Wang, et al. 
2011). One manager in Case B pointed out that many firms view EC regulatory legislation as 
overly broad, complex and conformance is tedious and cumbersome. In light of that, many firms 
will try to circumvent the regulations to avoid the high costs of compliance (Pautz, 2011).  
In literature, the dominant views on regulation control are tit-for-tat enforcement strategy (TFT) 
(Scholz, 1984) and enforcement pyramid (Braithwaite, 1989). The TFT and the enforcement 
pyramid are both based on the premise that best-practice regulation must incorporate a mix of 
punishment and persuasion (Bricknell, 2010). Managers in Case E argue some of the current 
penalties are too steep with the threat of increasing sanctions if non-compliance continues. 
However, managers in the case studies differ on how intricate or complex the punishment needs 
to be. Managers in Cases D and F pointed out that to be really effective the penalty should be as 
steep as possible, for example, incapacitation in the form of licence suspension and (or) 
sentencing senior managers to jail should be included. 
Thus, given the context of Chinese social structure, social control theory (Ellickson, 1987; 
Gibbs, 1989) maybe useful in explaining issues in which the policies of environmental protection 
intersect with the interests of firms. Table 4 shows the three elements of EC regulatory control 
system (adapted from Ellickson (1987), Gililand and Manning (2002): a) regulatory controller; b) 
informal control; and c) formal control. Thus, to ensure EC regulation compliance, all three 
elements of control system need to be explored further. The manager in Case A pointed out that 
by considering compliance and opportunism, it is only possible to investigate both intended and 
unintended effects of EC regulation i.e. the extent to which firms willingly comply or behave 
opportunistically to avoid discovery. 
Table 4. Environmental Regulatory Control System 
  
Managers in Cases A and C pointed that there should not be a one size fits all approach for 
regulatory control. An effective approach should tailor to local requirements and be flexible 
enough to promote self-regulation and voluntary participation. The manager in Case A shared his 
frustration with the current traditional command and control approach to regulation. He argued 
that there should be more voluntary agreements, education and information schemes, as well as 
market imposed pressure to guide EC enforcement. In short, the participants prefer a mix 
approach to environmental regulation that is grounded in punishment, transparency and 
flexibility (Bricknell, 2010). 
4.2 Indirect or Unintended or Unforeseen Consequences 
Oxford English dictionary defines unintended consequences as ‘an activity that has produced a 
consequence that was not planned with any intent or purpose’. Thus, many participants in the 
case study argued that it is vital to understand the meaning and also the causes of unintended 
consequences. The good intention of EC regulations could result in a positive or negative effect 
on the firm and its environment. Thus, policy makers need to fully understand or anticipate the 
causes of unintended consequences if they were to develop effective EC regulations. Merton 
(1936) pointed out five possible causes of unanticipated consequences as:  
 Ignorance – Incapable to anticipate everything which lead to incomplete analysis 
 Error-  Incorrect analysis of the problem  
 Immediate interest – Influence by current priority that overrides long-term interests 
 Basic values – Prohibit certain actions even if the long-term results might be unfavorable  
 Self-defeating prophecy - Anticipate solutions before the problem occurs due to fear of 
some consequences or uncertainties. 
 14 
 
One of the managers in Case B shared his recent experience. In the drive to meet the carbon 
footprint measure, he found that inventory at various warehouses had increased in two folds and 
machine utilisation had suffered in general. This is because a truck will not deliver goods unless 
it is on full load (in order to reduce carbon footprint). Hence, managers will put on different 
goods to fill up the truck or delay the delivery (resulting in machine stoppage in plants that 
waiting for the parts).  He further pointed out that good performance on certain chosen measures 
is not good enough, and likely to produce unintended consequences, if unchecked. EC measures 
should align with a firm’s corporate strategy and with performance that safeguard a firm’s 
success, such as customer satisfaction, sustainable operations, and others. Clearly, it is vital for 
policy makers to understand the causes of unintended consequences when setting EC measures. 
In the literature, many scholars point out that deliberate change to a system may result in 
unintended consequences (Lu et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2011). More than often, these effects are 
unanticipated and beyond the control of the managers who introduced them. A list of 
unanticipated effects in literature is shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Various Sources of Unanticipated Effects Identified in Literature 
 
 One of the participants point out that the negative consequences of unclear EC regulations are 
many. For example, the lack of clearly defined measures can cause uncertainty among firms as to 
what could be considered deceptive or perverse. Risk-averse firms may therefore choose to avoid 
certain products altogether, even when their manufacturing operations are environmentally sound. 
One manager in Case D argues that the lack of consensus and clear definition in the EC 
regulations may create more harm than good. For example, it may impede firms’ competitive 
advantage in the market place if environmentally sound products were regarded otherwise. 
Nonetheless, he argues one positive unintended consequence of EC is instillation of strong 
interests in environmentalism within a firm. Implementing EC often results in the creation of an 
environmental affairs department (for large firms, in general) and the establishment of employee 
environmental education programs (Feinstein, 2013). Thus, clear and careful EC regulations will 
bring direct positive consequences with little unforeseen negative effects. 
 
4.3 Dysfunctional Effects of Environmental Performance Measures 
During the case studies, a few concerns were raised by the managers on the negative unintended 
effects of regulations on environmental management measures and environmental performance. 
One manager highlighted that some of the EC measures are not specific enough, thus providing 
an opportunity for some firms to ‘play game’ with the measures. Most participants believe that 
robust measures fit for accountability purposes are required to reduce unintended negative 
consequences. This view is echoed in Ridgway (1956) seminal article that pointed out that firms 
experience dysfunctional consequences of performance measurements due to indiscriminate use 
or from insufficient knowledge of the full effects and consequences.  One participant pointed out 
that “many firms fall short of full compliance in EC regulations at some points, but they believe 
fines due to violation of EC regulations were just a small cost of doing business”. One of the 
managers pointed that many firms believe they could use poor (broad and not rigorous) 
environmental management measures set by the central government to skirt EC laws.  
One participant in Case E, whose plant develops and produces coating materials, related 
her dissatisfaction with the performance measurement system at her firm. The measures in her 
plant changes frequently (quarterly or so). One quarter the performance measurement 
emphasized was flexibility (i.e. ability to change volume and product range to suit last minute 
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customer demands). The performance measure emphasized that follows was the machine 
efficiency. She argues that it is difficult to juggle two in-compatible measures at the same time 
without long term changes in operations practices. The continual change in direction caused by 
the “shifting goal post” is frustrating. Moreover, it is hard to maintain a consistent focus and to 
remain motivated, she reckoned. 
Similar views were pointed out one participant in Case B pointed out the ever-changing 
measures to reflect the “hot” item of the month is a form of punishment.  Punishment does 
nothing to increase the likelihood of good performance and will only eliminate the poor 
performance temporarily (Solomon, 1964). Many scholars (Blossom et al, 1999; Meyer, 2009; 
Tan and Rae, 2009) reported dysfunctional consequences of performance measurement systems. 
Through information gathered from the case study and the archival studies, Table 6 shows a list 
of possible poor EC measures that led to unintended consequences.  
 
Table 6:  Various Sources of Poor Environmental Management Measures 
  
 
During the case studies, managers also provided many examples of poor measures and the 
dysfunctional consequences. Managers in Case F argue that measures to decrease gaming are 
necessary to prevent perverse outcomes. EC goals should be specific, ambitious, and measurable 
against an established baseline, such as carbon emissions. Firm F has a long-term orientation 
(more than four years) that is cascaded down into business strategy. In other words, the measures 
should be unmistaken by all employees. One of the good practices was illustrated by Case D. To 
meet the EC carbon emissions measure, the initial measure setup in the factories was “reduce 
packaging”. However, the measure is vague and doesn’t say the target (how much to reduce), the 
formula for its calculation, how often to collect the data, when to achieve the target, or compared 
with what benchmark. As a result of this, employees fiddle the measure in order to achieve the 
set target (avoid punishment). One of the plant managers in Case D eventually realised the 
mistake and develop a robust and more specific measure i.e. “reduce 5 million tons of packaging 
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by 2012 in the Make & Pack department”. With a robust measure, it is easier for everyone in the 
Make & Pack department to gear toward the goal together with clear objective. 
 
Clearly, in terms of EC regulations, engagement with firms is an essential part of producing 
meaningful performance measures. One of the participants stated that a collaborative relationship 
between policy makers and firms (based on mutual trust) is required for long-term progress. The 
manager in Case A highlighted that firms should be involved in the formulation of EC measure 
to ensure it is developed according to its intended use. A feasible and effective level of 
specificity in the EC measures must be laid down (Sueyoshi & Goto, 2012). Moreover, 
regulators should not merely have a say in nature of the choice of outcome measure, but also in 
how it is best communicated to firms and the wider public. 
 
5. Implication of the Research 
Moving forward, regulators should take into consideration the advantages and shortcomings of 
the various unintended consequences highlighted in section 4 when setting EC measures. The 
aim is to minimize confusion and susceptibility to opportunist behaviour. Figure 2 illustrates 
how deliberate EC measures could be resulted in either positive or negative consequences. Often, 
unclear or unrealistic EC goals may trigger or encourage firms to game or bend ethical rules. For 
example, in Case D, one of the managers highlighted that when CEO tells managers to do 
whatever it takes to achieve the set EC measures, it will invite questionable responses (as 
managers face difficulties in complying but dare not raise the issue). Thus, EC or managers may 
routinely encourage or delegate unethical behaviours to other, and not always consciously 
(Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011). EC regulators and firms have a history of complicated 
interactions regarding environmental regulation (Feinstein, 2013). Firms tend to perceive EC 
regulation as costly and imposing constraints on firms’ freedom to manage operations. Many 
managers criticise command and control approach to EC being not flexible (for firms to meet 
environmental objectives in different forms). Moreover, there is a lack of incentives to encourage 
firms to go extra miles to improve environmental performance beyond compliance. As illustrated 
 in Figure 2, the unintended effects of EC regulations are that firms unable to comply may fiddle 
with the measures. The results will be negative unforeseen consequences from well-planned 
policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This research provides a significant contribution to knowledge to EC, regulatory control, and PM 
related research. A good understanding of the linkages between regulatory control and PM will 
assist policy makers by providing knowledge about the potential unintended consequences of 
their policies.  Thus, policy makers could take this research finding into consideration when 
setting policy frameworks (i.e. by minimizing the negative effects and be able to take advantage 
of the positive consequences). The three main themes identified in this research provide 
valuables lessons to EC regulation policy settings and research.  Table 7 summarizes the 
theoretical and practical implications of the research findings. It also highlights the similarities of 
comments across the cases. 
•       Regulatory control – To stay competitive in today’s global market, reducing operating costs 
is the top priority of many firms. However, in order to reduce the cost associated with EC 
compliance, some opportunist firms will deliberately try to circumvent the regulations. In this 
study, our research findings show that a poor understanding of the indirect effects of regulatory 
control may lead to more harm than good. For example, existing formal control may increase the 
level of opportunist conduct. From the case studies, we found that social control theory 
(Ellickson, 1987) could be used to better understand or manage how firms skirting EC laws. An 
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Figure 2: Unforeseen consequences  
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effective approach should tailor to local requirements and be flexible enough to promote self-
regulation and voluntary participation. By considering compliance and opportunism, it is only 
possible to investigate both intended and unintended effects of EC regulation i.e. the extent to 
which firms are willing to comply or to behave opportunistically for avoiding discovery. There 
should be more voluntary agreements, education and information schemes, as well as market 
imposed pressure to guide EC enforcement; rather than just the traditional command and control 
approach. 
•       Indirect effects – We identified various unanticipated effects reported in literature that could 
enable policy makers to understand the nature of unintended consequences.  This research 
highlights that any changes to a system can have unintended consequences i.e. strong ripple 
effects beyond the control of policy makers who introduced them.  The result is something which 
could have a positive or negative effect on the firm and its environment. Lack of clearly defined 
measures can cause uncertainty among firms as to what could be considered deceptive or 
opportunist conduct. When setting measures, regulators and managers should be clear on whose 
behaviour they are trying to influence and consider their potential responses. Regular reviews are 
required to adjust the measures to suit the intended purposes. Thus, future research into 
unintended consequences of EC regulations should pay attention to the various sources of 
unintended consequences identified in this research. 
•       Dysfunctional of performance measurement – In this research, we highlighted various 
categories of dysfunctional consequences of performance measurement systems. Thus, only 
measures with little room of inducing unintended adverse consequences should be used for 
accountability purposes. Moreover, regulators should not merely have a say in nature of the 
choice of outcome measure, but also in how it is best communicated to firms and the wider 
public. In the research, we found that most firms would benefit from bringing more discipline to 
their EC initiatives by applying basic performance measurement principles: set specific and 
robust measures, create accountability for performance, eliminate the tendency to instil fear, and 
communicate the results to better motivate the workers. Thus, further research in this area is 
 necessary for a better understanding of how behaviour may be oriented toward better 
accomplishment of EC regulations. 
Table 7. Theoretical and Practical Implications of Research Findings 
 
Main Theme Phenomenon Theoretical Implications Practical Implications 
Regulatory Control 
 EC regulatory system too 
complex (A,B,C,D,E,F) 
 A mix approach 
(punishment, transparency 
& flexibility) needed to EC 
regulation (B,C,D,E,F) 
 Harsh punishment if 
regulated firms failed to 
conform to the EC rules.(C, 
D,E) 
 To what extent firms 
willingly comply or behave 
opportunistically to avoid 
discovery (A, F) 
 An effective approach 
should be flexible enough 
to promote self-regulation 
and voluntary participation 
(A, C) 
 
Opportunist firms 
will deliberately 
try to circumvent 
the regulations. 
Social control theory 
(Ellickson1987): To 
promote self-regulation 
and voluntary 
participation. 
 
-Promote voluntary 
agreements, education, 
information scheme, and 
market pressure for 
environmental best practices. 
-Don’t rely solely on 
traditional command and 
control approaches. 
Indirect Effects of regulatory 
control to firms 
 The lack of clearly defined 
measures can cause 
uncertainty among firms as 
to what could be 
considered deceptive or 
perverse (A, B, C, D, E, F) 
 Careful EC regulations will 
reduce unforeseen negative 
effects (A, E) 
Various indirect 
effects and 
potential “ripple” 
consequences to 
policy 
implementation. 
Build up a theoretical 
framework that involves a 
systematic approach to 
tackle the potential 
unintended consequences. 
Identify the various sources of 
unintended consequences 
(e.g. predict the potential 
firms’ responses to specific 
measures before 
implementation) 
Dysfunctional effects of 
performance measurement 
 A robust measure is needed 
for everyone to gear toward 
the goal together with clear 
objective (A, B, C, D, F) 
 A collaborative 
relationship between policy 
makers and firms (based on 
mutual trust) is required for 
long-term progress (A, C, 
E) 
Various 
categories of 
dysfunctional 
consequences of 
performance 
measurement 
have been 
identified. 
Expand the theoretical 
framework by integrating 
the various categories of 
dysfunctional 
consequences of 
performance measurement 
and their related remedies 
for environmental 
management. 
-Clearly defined, specific, 
robust performance measures 
should be adopted; 
-Create accountability for 
performance rather than only 
rely on fear or punishment. 
 
Note: A, B, C, D, E, F refers to the case companies. 
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Based on a systematic study of a sample of six firms and supporting examples from literatures 
and archival sources, this study has successfully examined the concept of unintended effects of 
environmental regulation and measures on firms’ operations and related performance outcomes. 
Though only limited cases, but this research provides important insights and external validity of 
the empirical data, thus enable the findings to be generalizable to firms to a wider context such 
as in other emerging economies. This study also notices that the Chinese cultural value of “face” 
and reputation could play a vital role in addressing the unintended consequences of EC 
regulations. In the case study, it was highlighted by managers that large firms good reputation 
will lose face if EC targets were not met. The dominant Chinese cultural values are documented 
as high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance and low individualism (Hofstede, 1980). 
Respect for hierarchy or high power distance is still deep rooted among the majority of the 
Chinese people and greatly influences Chinese business culture (Li and Tang, 2009). Future 
research could take into account of the Chinese cultural values. Moreover, based on six cases, 
the reported weaknesses, and unintended consequences of environmental regulation is limited 
and not comprehensive. Further research (more longitudinal and in-depth case studies) can 
provide further evidence to support the three themes identified in this study. In addition, a focus 
of heavy regulated industry sector (such as mining, power and utility) could provide better 
insights to strengthen the three identified themes. 
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